On the night of 11 to 12 October 2026, at about 700 food sites across France, the defrost settings on the refrigeration controllers were changed. Freezers warmed through the small hours. By France's own count, in at least 15 cases a fire started.
Three weeks later it happened again, on the night of 1 to 2 November, in at least 18 European countries. Mostly not to the big chains this time. To franchisees, village shops, butchers, a warehouse in Sweden, and three cold-storage sites of the French blood service.
Nobody broke into a supermarket chain. Nobody needed to. The controllers were reachable from the open internet, many of them on the factory password, and in case after case the retailer did not know they were.
What happened, as far as anyone has said
This is the picture as it stood on 16 November. France has published an attribution for the October attack and nobody has attributed the November one, so I have kept what authorities have said apart from what I am reading into it.
The equipment. Supermarket refrigeration is run by small supervisory controllers, mostly from two manufacturers. Refrigeration contractors install them and reach them remotely, very often over the store's own broadband line or a 4G modem the contractor fitted. For years thousands of these controllers have sat on the open internet. Some are models that stopped receiving updates in 2021.
The long warning. The manufacturer itself described real attacks on the same model, in Russia and Israel, in 2022. Fixes for the main known flaws were published in May and August 2025 and February 2026. In August 2026 researchers published the details and counted 2,765 exposed units of one model alone. On the night of the French attack, the main fix was about 17 months old.
The first wave. France's cyber agency says the controllers at about 700 sites were compromised and defrost settings forced high, with heavy stock losses. The chains' own counts come to roughly 500, and the minister's figure may include sites that disconnected as a precaution; I note the gap rather than resolve it. On 9 November France attributed the attack to a unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. That is France's position, with its evidence summarised rather than published, and I treat it as such. The head of the agency told the Senate what had been exploited: "basic security failings", starting with direct internet exposure and weak passwords.
The warnings between. Authorities across Europe told operators to take the controllers off the internet. Many did. One scanning firm watched exposed units of the main model in France fall from 1,825 to 537 in three days. Across both controller families in Europe, exposed units roughly halved. And yet, by another firm's count, about six in ten long-lived exposed controllers in the attacked countries were still reachable on the night of the second wave.
The second wave. It hit almost no chain's centrally managed stores. It hit independents, franchisees, small businesses, a charity shop, a rented cold room. Two pro-Russian groups claimed it on Telegram, then deleted the posts; three research firms consider the claim unfounded and no authority supports it. The head of Romania's cyber directorate called it "semi-amateurish" and said it did not look like a state actor. One analysed unit still had its factory login, "so no exploit was needed".
The cost. No European total exists. Individual stores report losses from tens of thousands to over 360,000 euros. One French retail group said its insurance does not cover this kind of incident. No blood products were lost.
This is the second of our Case Files: a real incident, read for what it teaches rather than who to blame. Somewhere a refrigeration engineer fitted a modem years ago so that he could fix a compressor without driving out at midnight, and nobody has told him yet that this is where it started.
The equipment nobody owned
Read the victims' own statements side by side and one idea keeps recurring. A Swedish chain said the affected stores "have their connectivity outside [its] central network". The equipment came from "an external service provider responsible for managing refrigeration systems". One French co-operative said plainly that it was a customer of refrigeration contractors, not of the manufacturer. A Finnish chain said the affected shops' cold equipment "had not been within our centralised protection".
Call it the equipment nobody owned. The retailer did not buy the controller; it arrived as part of a contractor's service. The retailer did not provide the connection; the contractor fitted a modem, or used the store's broadband. The retailer's security team never saw either, because neither was on its network. And the contractor, reasonably enough, considered the controller the customer's equipment on the customer's premises.
One threat-intelligence firm put it carefully: responsibility "is often distributed across asset owners, integrators, maintenance providers and equipment vendors", and that division "should not result in persistent exposure". Belgium's cyber centre put it less carefully: operators who use insecure systems do so "at their own risk". In Estonia a retailer's IT director said the biggest risk is the maintenance partners, and the refrigeration trade body replied that installers do not usually act without the owner's agreement. I think both are right, which is the whole problem.
Here is the thing I keep coming back to. This was not a supply-chain attack in the usual sense, where an attacker compromises a supplier to reach its customers. Nobody with standing says any refrigeration contractor's own network was breached, and the one Belgian installer that was asked denied it outright. France's economy minister told parliament on 13 October that a company "can be perfectly prepared, but if its suppliers are not, it remains exposed itself", and framed the attack as one on the manufacturer's platform. The cyber agency's account a week later did not bear that out. It was simpler and worse: exposure and weak passwords, site by site.
So it was a supply-chain failure. A piece of equipment the business could not run without was specified, installed, connected and maintained by other parties, and securing it was in nobody's job description. The attacker did not need to break the chain. The gaps between its links were enough.
One detail from France's alert stays with me. It told operators to check their insurance terms before cutting the data feed, because remote monitoring can be a condition of the policy. The link that exposed the controller may have been there because somebody's insurer asked for it.
What is still unknown
Who carried out the November wave, and whether it was the October actor or imitators; one firm sees similarities and says they "may" be the same, and no authority has said so. How the November attackers got in: one unit shows a factory password, a decoy recorded an attempt on an unpublished flaw, and six newly disclosed flaws have not been tied to any attack. Whether any contractor, or a remote-access product several of them share, was itself compromised. Which contractors served the French sites; none has been named. And a European total, in sites and in money.
What compliance would have changed
Most of us will never run a cold chain. But almost every organisation has equipment it could not work without, which somebody else installed, connects to and maintains. The controls below would not have found the attackers. They would have changed what the attackers found.
Count it as yours, with a name next to it. An asset inventory (ISO 27001 Annex A 5.9) that includes contractor-run equipment, franchised sites included. The tell in this case is that national authorities had to scan the internet to tell owners what they had.
Know every route by which a supplier reaches your premises. Supplier relationships (5.19) and network security (8.20) start with a question most retailers had never asked: is there a modem on that wall, and whose is it?
Put it in the contract, then check. Supplier agreements (5.20) that say nothing reachable from the internet, no factory passwords, updates within an agreed time, end-of-life equipment replaced, incidents reported. One lawyer's reading is that maintenance contracts usually allocate this risk by not mentioning it. Then monitoring of supplier services (5.22), because a clause nobody checks is a wish.
Keep building systems off the internet. Segregation of networks (8.22) is the one measure every authority and both manufacturers agree on. Patching would not have been enough; one unit was on its factory login.
An alarm the attacker cannot reach. Monitoring (8.16) that is independent of the controller being tampered with. Where it existed the story was short: one Estonian store's partner caught the change quickly and the store lost nothing; an Irish chain's monitoring alerted it and the stores were back the same evening.
Someone whose job is to act on an authority's alert, for every site. Threat intelligence (5.7) and contact with authorities (5.5) are only useful if a person owns the follow-through. Three weeks and several national alerts separated the waves.
A plan for losing refrigeration overnight. Readiness for continuity (5.30), because the stock loss arrived before anyone knew why.
This is the part of compliance we care most about at Askara Solutions. For most of these victims, NIS2 did not apply: its food sector covers wholesale and processing, not store retail, and most franchisees sit below the size threshold anyway. Managing the refrigeration contractor's security was not a legal duty. It was a choice, which is what a management system is for.
The freezer in the back of a shop is the plainest version of a question every organisation has. What is running your business that you did not buy, cannot see, and have never counted? And who, on your side, has their name next to it?



